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Prior to considering differentiated integration in European Union industrial policy, it 
is first necessary to understand what this policy encompasses. EU industrial policy 
incorporates a range of policies that have a direct or indirect impact upon industry. 
The European Commission (2005) adopts an official definition of industrial policy 
that is narrow and focused upon manufacturing, effectively excluding service 
industries. In its view, industrial policy involves creating the conditions for 
manufacturing to thrive, complementing work at the member-state level. The EU’s 
industrial policy officially includes seven cross-sector initiatives – on 
competitiveness, energy and the environment; intellectual property rights; better 
regulation; industrial research and innovation; market access; skills; and managing 
structural change – which is to benefit a wide range of industrial sectors. In addition, 
the Commission has introduced seven new initiatives targeted at specific sectors – 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, space, defence, information and communication 
technologies, mechanical engineering, food and fashion and design industries.  
 
EU industrial policy is officially geared towards proposing specific solutions to 
improve the competitiveness of European industry and prevent de-industrialisation, 
notably ‘in the light of increasingly strong competition from China and Asia’ 
(Commission 2005: 1). It is also ‘an important step in the delivery of the new Lisbon 
“Partnership for Growth and Jobs”’ (ibid.). The Lisbon Agenda focuses upon 
competitiveness, stimulating innovation and supporting small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) as part of the broader goals of transforming the EU into ‘the most 
dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world … by 2010’. EU 
industrial policy covers a range of internal market legislation that regulates the 
operation of industry, including health and safety legislation and environmental 
legislation (see the chapter by Wurzel and Zito in this volume). It includes support for 
research and development (R&D) and, potentially, aid for ‘declining industrial 
regions’. Not least, it incorporates the application of EU competition policy and the 
restrictions imposed through this policy on national industrial policies. 
 
EU industrial policy differs from what is traditionally known as industrial policy, 
which encompasses everything that governments can do to influence industry 
including financial and fiscal intervention. Until the 1980s, the concept of industrial 
policy was synonymous with market-distorting actions by national governments. EU 
state aid rules had little practical effect upon national practices because the 
Commission was unable to control the sheer volume of subsidies and other assistance 
to companies. The EU itself possesses few policy instruments, weak legal basis and 
little funding to intervene actively to promote particular industries outside of 
agriculture, coal and steel. The heyday of EU industrial interventionism was during 
the first half of the 1980s, when the Commission led schemes to cushion the 
restructuring of the steel industry by enforcing production quotas. The Single 
European Act’s Article 130 (Articles 163-173 TEC) sanctioned new EU funding to 
subsidize cross-border R&D. There is also a legal basis for exemptions to the 
application of EU competition policy to allow for interventionist national industrial 
policies. Provisions in the Treaty of Rome (Articles 87-89 TEC) specify categories of 
national state aid to industry that are not incompatible with the common market (i.e. 
those having a ‘social character’) or not necessarily incompatible (e.g. ‘aid to promote 
the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low’) 
and the possibility of creating new categories. 
 
With the rise of economic liberalism and the decline (but not disappearance) of 
national interventionism, EU industrial policy was shaped by national preference for 
state withdrawal from the economy. The EU’s less interventionist approach to 
industrial policy dates from the early 1990s and Martin Bangemann’s takeover of the 
industrial policy portfolio. Bangemann (1992: 20) insisted that the ‘old, sectoral 
industrial policy would be replaced by a modern, horizontal approach which would no 
longer support individual industrial [sectors] but competitiveness on a large scale’. 
This new policy corresponded to the reinforced application of EU competition policy 
rules. Nonetheless, in a limited range of areas, notably information technology, the 
Commission continued to push for major investment programmes. France and some 
other member states also continued to demand a more active EU policy. Provisions 
were inserted into the Maastricht Treaty (now Article 173 Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty) pledging the EU and its member states to ensure the ‘conditions necessary for 
the competitiveness’ of industry, to provide greater assistance to SMEs and to ensure 
improved industrial exploitation of the EU’s research policies. Yet, because these 
provisions outline a strategy more than they mandate a policy and require unanimity 
in the Council to adopt actions, strong constraints have been placed upon the potential 
development of EU-led interventionism (Peterson 1996). 
 
Differentiated integration in this policy area is the result of one or more of five 
factors: differences in ideology among member states, domestic political 
circumstances, capacity (level of economic development), national economic 
structures, and technical preferences. There is a considerable degree of ‘capitalist 
diversity’ in the EU (Wilks 1996). Even among the ‘Original Six’ member states there 
are important differences in approach to economic regulation, even if they all embrace 
the EU system (Gerber 2000). Ideological difference may contribute to differentiation 
in that member states where economic liberalism holds more sway in government 
circles will pursue different policies than those pursued by member states where 
interventionist solutions to industrial problems are more acceptable. Different levels 
of economic development have repeatedly been used as a justification for temporary 
derogations for poorer member states in the implementation of EU legislation. 
Justifications stemming from ideology, economic development and structures can 
result in differentiated participation in EU-led or other European R&D projects. 
Technical preference has been a cited reason for delays in certain national 
programmes of sector-based market liberalisation.  
 
In several areas these five factors overlap, and assessing their relative importance is 
difficult. Thus in energy market liberalisation, ideology and domestic political 
opposition have had a potentially significant role. There is an entrenched scepticism 
in certain member states about the desirability of liberalising the production and 
supply of electricity and gas, on the grounds that these are public services which 
should be protected from market forces. Ideology is also likely to be of relevance with 
regard to national infringements of EU competition policy. However, the national 
rhetoric of protectionism versus liberalism does not correlate perfectly with the degree 
to which member states abide by EU internal market and competition policy rules. 
 
Differentiated integration in industrial policy areas is largely ‘soft’ and unofficial and 
comes in three forms: varying national participation in EU and other European 
projects; the discretion permitted in the implementation of EU legislation; and varying 
levels of compliance with EU legislation. Legally entrenched, multi-speed 
differentiation is present principally in terms of temporary derogation on a limited 
range of EU legislation. The explicit legal sanction of more permanent differentiation 
in industrial policy areas is rare. The permitted provision of State Aids to poorer 
regions is, potentially, one example – to the extent that this permission contributes to 
differentiation in national practice. The penultimate section of this chapter presents 
one recent legislative development that effectively entrenches differentiation in 
energy markets and potentially undermines market integration in this sector.  
 
It is necessary to draw a distinction between differentiated participation and 
differentiated integration. The former in, say, EU-led industrial initiatives and non-EU 
R&D and industrial projects does not necessarily result in differentiated integration. 
In some cases differentiated participation will reflect existing differentiated 
integration in linked areas (for example, defence industry cooperation). However, in 
others differentiated participation will simply reflect the reality of different national 
economic structures. Table 21.1 provides an overview of the various policy areas that 
can be considered to be part of industrial policy and the kinds of differentiated 
participation and integration that have arisen in these areas. Rather than consider each 
in turn, examples will be drawn to demonstrate different forms of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
differentiation. 
 
<Insert Table 21.1 here> 
 
 
Non-EU Projects and Differentiation 
 
European R&D programmes and industrial projects involving some or many (but not 
all) EU member states potentially contribute to differentiated integration. These 
include the European Space Agency (ESA), ESPRIT, Eureka, JET, Airbus and 
Ariane. Differentiated participation reflects principally different levels of economic 
development and economic structures, but also, potentially, different ideology. 
Wallace and Wallace (1995: 53) note that the term ‘variable geometry’ was originally 
used in the late 1970s in industrial policy where different member states would 
participate in different consortia along functional lines, especially to enhance their 
technological capabilities. The term was used mainly because the member states 
chose to invest in a policy outside regular Community action. However, the authors 
did not consider these projects – namely, JET, Eureka, Airbus and Ariane – to be 
significant examples of variable geometry because they were not ‘Communitarized’ 
and did not play a major part in the overall dynamics of European integration.1 While 
this is a valid claim, the developing links between some of these projects and EU 
policies mean that they should be considered in terms of their potential contribution to 
differentiated integration. 
 
Membership in Eureka (the European high technology research coordinating agency) 
has, over the more than two decades of its existence, differed from EU membership. 
Member-state participation has varied over time depending on the projects funded. 
The creation of Eureka in 1985 reflects in part the ideological preference of French 
(notably Socialist-led) governments seeking to increase the effectiveness of state 
intervention through multi-national European coordination. However, while French 
governments (joined by the Commission) pushed for more EC R&D funding, 
Germany and the UK were more reluctant to expand the EC’s budget (Peterson 1993). 
Eureka was created as an intergovernmental framework for promoting cross-border 
collaboration in pre-competitive research and for keeping more funding at the national 
level rather than transferring it through the Commission and the EU Framework 
Programmes.  
 
Eureka membership presently includes all the EU member states, with the exception 
of Bulgaria which nonetheless possesses a national information point allowing it to 
participate in Eureka projects. There are an additional 13 non-EU members, including 
Russia and Turkey. Large amounts of public and private funding have been mobilised 
to support the R&D carried out within the Eureka framework. Although Eureka is not 
an EU programme, it has been closely linked with the EU and the objectives of the 
Lisbon Agenda. Most Eureka projects funded have tended to involve a limited 
number of big European firms (e.g. Thomson-SGS, Plessy, Siemens and Philips) – 
and, despite efforts to include more SMEs, the large firms tend to dominate decision 
making (Peterson 1993). Most projects involve only a limited number of EU member 
states, and the larger member states will tend to be involved in funding more projects 
than others. Unlike Eureka, the European Strategic Programme for Information 
Technology (ESPRIT) was an EC/EU R&D programme and, from 1993, was 
managed by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Industry. Operating from 
1983-1999, Esprit facilitated a diverse range of partnerships and joint ventures among 
representatives of government, industry, universities, and research institutes, with 
differentiated levels of participation.  
 
The impact of Eureka, Esprit and other R&D programmes upon European integration 
has been analyzed in terms of rejecting the old strategies of national champions, 
promoting close cooperation among European firms, facilitating the adoption of 
common European standards (thus eliminating important non-tariff barriers), and 
laying the basis for a lobby pushing for European market integration (Sharp 1990). 
Differentiated participation in these projects has also contributed to different influence 
in shaping certain aspects of European market integration, as well as reflecting 
differentiated integration into a European research community. However, 
differentiated participation has not contributed to differentiated integration per se. 
 
There is considerable differentiation in the field of atomic energy research. All EU 
member states are members of Euratom. However, seven EC/EU member states have 
not in the past participated , or do not at present participate, in the principal centre for 
fundamental physics and computer science research, CERN, the European 
Organisation for Nuclear Research. While the industrial applications of research at 
CERN may be limited, CERN itself has involved significant industrial collaboration, 
notably in the construction of the rapid particle accelerator. CERN was founded in 
1954, and membership included all the Original Six in addition to several other 
European countries. Most, but not all, other European countries joined prior to their 
EC membership. Those member states that have more developed programmes in 
atomic energy research are equally those with a greater presence at CERN, and 
national funding contributions (on a per capita basis) have varied considerably.  In 
2009 eight EU member states were not members:  Ireland, Romania, the three Baltic 
States, Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia. 
 
Just under a third of the budget for the EC’s Seventh Research Framework 
Programme – €2 750 million for the period 2007-2011 – is earmarked for research in 
the field of nuclear fission, to be carried out either by means of a programme of 
indirect actions or by the EU’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), focusing on the safe 
exploitation and development of fission reactor systems, the management of 
radioactive waste, radiation protection and safety, and security related to non-
proliferation. Nearly two-thirds of this funding will go towards research in the field of 
fusion energy, based on work taking place in the International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor (ITER) project. This project in turn derives from previous work 
undertaken since the first EC research programme, which funded the establishment of 
the Joint European Torus (JET) at Culham, Oxfordshire. JET has frequently not 
involved all EU member states. Since 2000, the European Fusion Development 
Agreement (EFDA) has directed the activities of JET. With the exception of Estonia, 
all EU member states now participate in EFDA, although several still do not 
participate in JET research and development. Given the importance of nuclear 
research in terms of EU priorities, the differentiated participation of EU member 
states in nuclear research projects can be said to contribute to differentiated 
integration. 
 
The memberships of the European Space Agency (ESA) and EU have frequently not 
corresponded, and non-EU countries have also been members of the ESA. There is 
some ‘multi-speed’ differentiation in member state participation. In order to 
participate in ESA procurements and most ESA programmes, a country must sign a 
European Cooperating State (ECS) Agreement as a first stage of membership. While 
the financial contribution of such a country increases, it is still much lower that that of 
a full member state. The ECS Agreement is normally followed by a Plan for European 
Cooperating States (or PECS Charter), a five-year programme of basic research and 
development activities, aimed at improving a country's space industry capacity. At the 
end of the five-year period the country can either begin negotiations to become a full 
member state in the ESA or an associated state or sign a new PECS Charter. Only one 
of the twelve newest EU member states is at present a full member:  the Czech 
Republic achieved this status at the start of 2009. Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia 
and Romania have signed ECS agreements, and Romania and Poland have signed the 
PECS Charter. Differing membership has an impact upon potential participation in the 
European space programme which covers all the activities and measures undertaken 
by the EU, ESA and national space organizations. The Ariane rocket system is 
manufactured under the authority of the ESA. While dominated by the French (the 
Centre National d’Études Spatiales) and the French company EADS Astrium, which 
is the prime contractor, a limited number of other EU member states and companies 
based in these countries have been involved in Ariane R&D. 
 
Airbus, one of the world’s two main large commercial aircraft manufacturers, also 
involves the participation of only a small number of EU member states. The bulk of 
Airbus staff is based at 16 sites in four EU member states: Germany, France, the UK 
and Spain. The governments of these countries initially developed Airbus as a 
consortium of publicly and privately-owned aerospace manufacturers to coordinate 
their R&D efforts. These companies were consolidated at the turn of the century, and 
since 2006 the French based-company EADS owns the entire Airbus company. 
 
Wallace and Wallace (1995: 54) specifically list two industrial policy areas where 
different levels of participation have had a more direct impact upon differentiated 
integration: the Trans-European Networks (the TENS) and the reconfiguration of the 
EU member-state defence industries. The TENS were created under provisions 
introduced in the Maastricht Treaty (Articles 154-156 TEC) and involve EU funding 
for major infrastructural projects to reinforce European market integration and 
contribute to European social and economic cohesion. The projects under 
development as TENS are, by their nature, selective in membership and in 
competition for limited resources. Differentiation has arisen through the selection of 
particular projects and particular countries or groups of countries. Defence is 
considered below in the context of bi- and multilateral industrial cooperation because 
the various projects that have been developed only involve a small number of EU 
member states. 
 
The Commission’s cross-sector policy initiatives do not create much scope for 
differentiated integration. However, the seven sector-specific initiatives or actions do 
create scope for differentiated participation of the member states to the extent that 
some member states are more involved than others by virtue of their presence in 
specific industrial sectors. The Steering Group of the Pharmaceuticals Forum, which 
held its first meeting in 2006, included representatives from only seven member states 
(although to ensure fairness these were representatives from recent and forthcoming 
Council presidencies). The High-level Group on the Chemicals Industry (meeting 
from 2007-09) was more exclusive and involved government representatives from 
only eight member states (principally the largest with a significant manufacturing 
presence in this sector). The Task Force on the Competitiveness of Information and 
Communication Technologies (meeting from 2005-06) did not include national 
representatives per se. However, its participants came for the most part from major 
corporations and organizations, effectively excluding participants from the majority of 
member states and almost all the newest member states. 
 
 
Bi- and Multilateral Member State Industrial Policy as Differentiation 
 
Non-EU, bilateral and multilateral industrial projects, funded by a limited number of 
national governments, are another form of differentiated participation. A large 
number of these projects have involved only France and Germany or have been led by 
these two countries. The impressive range of proposals over the past two decades 
suggests a Franco-German core in industrial policy. However, Cole’s chapter 
demonstrates the failure of most of these initiatives, outside the realm of aerospace 
and defence where public procurement policies are of great importance. The recent 
collapse of the project to create a search engine Quaero is a good example of the 
limits of Franco-German bilateralism.  
 In defence procurement there are several examples of on-going Franco-German 
cooperation.2 The merger of Aerospatiale-Matra (France) and Daimler-Chrysler 
Aerospace (Germany) in 1992 led to the development of Eurocopter that in 2000 
became a subsidiary of EADS. Eurocopter produced the Tiger multi-role attack 
helicopter that began production in March 2003 and will be capable of providing air-
ground combat support. The Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) 
was established in 1996 to manage collaborative armaments programmes by France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK (joined by Belgium in 2003 and Spain in 2005). It has 
provided an important framework, enabling the cross-national coordination of 
procurement. Membership is open to other EU and NATO member states, which also 
have the option of participating in a procurement programme under a cooperative 
agreement (as is the case with the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Turkey). OCCAR 
has coordinated cooperation for several joint European ventures which reinforce the 
capacity of European states to undertake crisis-management operations within 
NATO/ESDP frameworks.  
 
There are also several examples of projects not involving both France and Germany, 
undermining claims of a special relationship and a European ‘core’. The Eurofighter 
alliance involves companies from the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain. The French-led 
‘nEUROn’ UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) has, since 2005, involved the 
delegation of 50 per cent of the work to other European partners – Alenia (Italy); 
Saab (Sweden), Hellenic Aerospace Industry (Greece); EADS CASA (Spain) and 
UAG (Switzerland). The FSAF (Future Surface-to-Air Anti-Missile Family), 
launched in October 1998, resulted in the development by France and Italy of 
common surface-to-air ground and naval-based anti-missile systems. The project has 
been developed under the Anglo-Franco-Italian Eurosam (ES) venture, established by 
Aerospatiale, Alenia and Thompson CSF in June 1989. Such bilateral and multilateral 
defence industrial projects are allowed because Treaty of Rome provisions exempted 
the armaments sector from Internal Market rules (Article 296b TEC).  
 
Wallace and Wallace (1995: 54) argue that the development of Eurocorps in the early 
1990s would have industrial implications which, in turn, would ‘bear on the debate 
about the “core” group for defence’. The subsequent development of ESDP in the 
1990s and 2000s and industrial developments further suggest that certain member 
states are more likely than others to be involved in bi- and multilateral industrial 
projects linked to the construction of a European military capacity. However, given 
that the countries involved to date in these projects are diverse, it is problematic to 
talk of the reinforcement of a ‘core’. Franco-German bilateralism in defence industry 
developments has been limited. There is potential relevance of varying participation 
in these projects to member-state participation in European military cooperation and 
the construction of ESDP. However, national economic capacity and industrial 
strategy – as in France’s refusal to participate in the Eurofighter project – is of much 
greater relevance. The majority of EU member states have not participated in these 
projects. The creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004 (as called for 
under Article 28D Lisbon Treaty) has reinforced the contribution of differentiated 
participation in joint defence research and industrial projects to differentiated 
integration, to the extent that EDA promoted projects become more closely tied to the 
construction of European military cooperation more broadly. Membership of the 
EDA is not a requirement for EU member states, although all except Denmark – 
which has an opt-out on the Common Foreign and Security Policy – have chosen to 
join. Article 28D2 of the Lisbon Treaty makes it clear that differentiated participation 
will shape the organization and activities of the Agency: 
 
The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States 
wishing to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and 
operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of 
effective participation in the Agency's activities. Specific groups shall 
be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged 
in joint projects.	  
 
 
Temporary Derogation as Differentiation 
 
Legal temporary derogation is provided for either through specific legislative 
provisions and accession treaty provisions adopted with regard to the application of 
policies that have significant cost implications for industry. Present or future member 
states argue that factors specific to their national industry (or broader economy) 
justify derogation. Notably, the poorer countries of Central and Eastern Europe have 
argued that many sectors of domestic industry were financially unable to comply with 
EU environmental and health and safety regulation. Thus, for example, the 2004 
accession treaties permitted a delay until the end of 2005 for the implementation of 
EU health and safety legislation. To provide a more specific example, temporary 
derogations were granted to seven of the ten 2004 applicants permitting the delayed 
implementation of certain provisions of the directive relating to waste electrical and 
electronic equipment (2002/96/EC). Existing member states have also benefited from 
specific provisions in EU legislation allowing for delayed implementation. The 
Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive 1994 (94/62/EC) allowed the then four 
poorest EU member states (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) a delay to achieve 
the waste recovery and recycling targets. The 2004 amendment to the directive which 
established new targets granted a revised derogation to Ireland, Portugal and Greece. 
 
 
Discretionary Differentiation 
 
Andersen and Sitter (2006) widen the use of the term differentiated integration ‘to 
capture both the formal and informal arrangements for policy opt-outs as well as the 
differences, or discretionary aspects, associated with putting EU policy into practice’ 
(313). They emphasise, in effect, the heterogeneity of integration. Given that member 
states implement directives differently, the result can be considerable intra-sector 
variation. Discretionary differentiation is particularly relevant with regard to the 
implementation of internal market, health and safety, and environmental legislation.  
 
There are two main sources of this kind of differentiation. First, member states can 
design directives to be less specific in order to allow for greater national margin of 
manoeuvre in implementation. Even those member states without considerable 
reservations about a directive may take advantage of the scope for discretion written 
into a directive (Andersen and Sitter 2006). When flexibility and voluntary measures 
replace strict requirements, the result is that states are effectively allowed – if not 
encouraged – to go their own way. Second, there are pressures for ‘de-coupling’ 
within member states, notably from regional and local governments, and institutional 
resistance, which can prevent governments from implementing policies that they have 
agreed at the EU level. Thus national governments may be committed to a directive 
and its implementation, but local resistance will result in its distorted implementation. 
Differentiation via discretion should be distinguished from differentiation through 
non-compliance, although pushing the boundaries of discretion can result in non-
compliance.  
 
There are several forms of discretion found in EU legislation. In addition to 
deliberately vague wording, allowing for the continuation of national practice, there is 
discretion for national room to manoeuvre in the achievement of a broad goal (e.g. 
sector-based liberalization). The liberalization of the telecommunications sector can 
be described as an example of multi-speed differentiation. EU directives allowed 
member states to liberalize at their own pace. The Commission adopted a gradualist 
approach that allowed considerable margin of manoeuvre to member states in terms of 
domestic organizational solutions and the timing of liberalization (Eyre and Sitter 
1999). However, in this sector a strong coalition of actors had incentives to pursue the 
goal of rapid liberalization in order to meet international market and technological 
challenges.  
 
A third form of discretion allows exemptions from legislative requirements for 
specific reasons. One recent example is in the REACH directive which allows for the 
application of a ‘socio-economic analysis’ to permit derogation (Articles 62(5)(a) and 
69(6)(b) and Annex XVI). To the extent that ‘socio-economic analysis’ might create a 
national bias (for example, allowing more flexible application of the rules in poorer 
member states), the result is scope for more patterned and permanent differentiation. 
 
 
Compliance and Non-compliance as Differentiation 
 
EU industrial policy can be described as ‘horizontal’, to the extent that policy seeks to 
compensate for the failure of national governments to provide open competitive 
markets (Nicolaides 1993; Peterson 1996). EU competition policy is thus a core 
element of the EU’s industrial policy. To the extent that levels of compliance by EU 
member states with EU competition policy and internal market rules on the free 
movement of capital differ, there is persistent differentiation in industrial policy. 
Different national compliance levels can also reflect the persistence of different 
national forms of industrial policy, interventionism and protectionism. These forms 
include the provision of state aid, intervention in mergers, protection of sectors from 
foreign ownership (including the ownership of companies based in other EU member 
states), and the maintenance of state ownership. There are also substantial differences 
in terms of member-state responses to decisions on infringement by the Commission 
and rulings by the European Court of Justice. 
 
<Insert tables 21.2 and 21.3 here>  
 
Although decreasing, the provision of state aid to industry – some of which 
contravenes EU rules – varies considerably from country to country. Table 21.4 
categorises state aid in terms of amounts provided. Sweden, Austria, Germany can be 
placed in the large provider category, while Britain provides relatively little. In terms 
of state aid for companies as a percentage of GDP (excluding agriculture, fisheries 
and transport), only six member states provide more than 0.6 per cent of GDP 
(notably, Germany, Austria and Sweden). Five provide less than 0.2 per cent of GDP 
(including the UK which provided .16 per cent in 2006. There are significant 
differences between member states in the sectors to which they direct state aid. 
However, prior to the international financial crisis and recession starting in 2008, the 
bulk of state aid in most member states has gone to manufacturing (60 and 66 per cent 
in Italy and Germany, with far higher percentages in smaller member states, including 
Sweden). In terms of aid to SMEs allowed under block exemptions, the amounts 
granted by Italy far exceed amounts granted by other member states (in terms of 
spending as a percentage of GDP) and comprised 45 per cent of the total. As a 
percentage of GDP, Irish, Belgian and Czech state aid was particularly high. On 
pending recovery cases, Spain, Italy and Germany are the worst offenders (in terms of 
total number of cases), while the majority of member states (including the UK) have 
no cases brought against them. 
 
<Insert Table 21.4 here> 
 
Several EU member states intervene regularly to encourage or block potential mergers 
and takeovers. France, Italy, Germany and Spain have engaged in interventionism on 
mergers with the aim of maintaining national ownership in particular sectors. Other 
member states – notably the UK and the Netherlands – pursue a more laisser-faire 
position. Several member states (but not all) have outlined a range of sectors that 
should be protected from foreign ownership. Several national governments maintain 
state ownership or control (through golden shares) of companies, which is not 
necessarily contrary to EU rules. Despite large privatization programmes over the past 
two decades, France and Italy in particular have large state-owned sectors. The 
governments of both countries have delayed the privatisation of state-owned former 
energy monopolies. National competition law (affecting the operation of companies 
which are located primarily in the national market and thus not subject to EU 
competition policy) continues to be distinct, which also reflects differing attitudes to 
the application of EU competition policy. Eyre and Lodge (2000) provide a detailed 
account of the Europeanization of competition law, describing the tension between 
convergence and divergence as countries have increasingly come to play a ‘European 
melody’, but with distinct ‘national tunes’. 
 
Since the launch of the Single Market Programme, the European Commission has 
sought to challenge public procurement by national governments that discriminate in 
favour of protected national firms and against foreign competitors. Total public 
procurement in the EU – i.e. the purchases of goods, services and public works by 
governments and public utilities – was estimated at about 16 per cent of the EU’s 
GDP or €1500 billion in 2002. Its importance varies significantly between Member 
States ranging between 11 per cent and 20 per cent of GDP 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/index_en.htm). An evaluation 
of the public procurement market demonstrates persistent differentiation. Those 
member states with relatively informal procurement legislation – notably Germany, 
the Netherlands and Denmark – before the adoption of EU directives and those which 
had more decentralized procurement practices (again Germany and the Netherlands) 
had more problems with compliance and more compliance costs.  A list of 
infringement cases brought by the Commission against EU member states for failing 
to follow public procurement rules demonstrates differentiation (Table 21.5). This list 
provide the best indication (albeit incomplete) of different government action with 
regard to respecting EU public procurement rules. The trends seen in the 
implementation of EU competition and internal market policy rules apply. The 
Scandinavian countries are the most compliant, whilst Germany and Italy have the 
greatest difficulty following EU rules, followed by Spain and France. Member states 
with strongly centralized procurement policies (like the UK or Portugal) are more 
likely to respect EU rules. 
 
<Insert table 21.5 here> 
 
Differentiation has persisted in the energy sector despite on-going efforts of the 
European Commission and certain member states to bring about liberalization 
(Andersen 2001). Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 86 TEC) equipped 
the Commission with the legal power unilaterally to break up national monopolies. 
Some member states, notably the UK, supported the Commission’s push for 
liberalization. Others, notably France and Germany, were sceptical if not hostile to 
full liberalization and the unbundling of production and supply. As a result, some 
member states have moved quickly towards liberalization, while others have dragged 
their heels. German and French governments stuck to the minimum requirements of 
the 1996 and 1998 directives to liberalize, respectively, the electricity and gas sectors 
(96/92/EC and 98/30/EC, revised in 2003), while EU-level legal action forced some 
action. In addition to ideological opposition to liberalization, there has been persistent 
domestic political opposition, with strong trade-union, party-political and public 
hostility – encouraged by the fear that gas and electricity prices would rise after 
liberalization. Third-party access to transmission networks for electricity and gas was 
blocked by several member states through the discretion allowed in the 1998 
directive: a combination of ambiguous wording and omissions. Member states were 
allowed to choose between regulated and negotiated third-party access, and to develop 
or maintain their national regulatory models. The Commission, encouraged by Britain 
and a minority of EU member states, pushed for a complete unbundling of production 
and supply. In several member states, public take-up of alternative energy providers 
has been minimal and market access restricted. Homogenous integration worked only 
with respect to limited policy initiatives in the energy sector such as price 
transparency for electricity and gas contracts.  
 
 
Legislated Differentiation 
 
In January 2008 the European Commission proposed a new directive on unbundling 
energy production. Previously, the Commission had demanded that energy producers 
sell off transmission networks. Because this demand met the intransigent opposition 
of several member states (the so-called Group of Eight: France, Germany, Austria, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovakia) and the EU continued to lack a 
clear legislative framework on energy, the Commission decided to change tack. Its 
proposed directive would effectively allow member states that had not decoupled to 
avoid doing so. Energy companies would not have to sell grids and pipelines. 
However, they would face tougher regulation and a requirement for more independent 
management. The Commission proposed the establishment of an independent system 
operator (ISO). Big energy companies would retain ownership of the transmission 
lines, but hand managing control over networks to an entirely separate operator which 
would be required to have a different group of shareholders from the parent company.  
 
This proposed compromise gesture was still rejected by the Group of Eight. In June 
2008, member-state governments reached a compromise, agreeing to embed into EU 
law the right for individual governments to choose one of three different models of 
unbundling: full ownership unbundling, when a parent company sells its transmission 
networks to a different firm; the independent system operator (ISO) option proposed 
by the Commission in January that allows big energy companies to retain ownership 
of the transmission lines, but requires them to transfer managing control over 
networks to an entirely separate operator (which would not share any shareholders 
with the parent company); and a third option – very close to the one preferred by the 
Group of Eight – the creation of a so-called independent transmission operator (ITO) 
which permits a parent company to retain ownership of transmission networks which 
would be heavily supervised by a national regulator. Under this new third option, the 
directive imposes additional requirements upon the parent company and the ITO to 
reinforce the independence of the latter, including a mechanism preventing top 
management from moving freely between a company's production and transmission 
wings. Furthermore, the national regulator would examine the transmission operator's 
development and investment plans and could demand changes.  
 
While the new directive will bring about a change in national practice in the eight 
member states which have to date opposed unbundling, on-going differentiation in the 
organization of national energy markets and regulation has been explicitly recognised. 
The result is the adoption of an unprecedented piece of EU legislation which 
explicitly recognizes differentiation in the operation of national energy markets. 
Opponents of the directive have argued that it effectively endorses the practices in 
certain member states which undermine full market liberalization and European 
market integration. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A complete study of differentiated integration in industrial policy would have to cover 
potentially all the policy areas mentioned in the introduction. Official opt-outs exist in 
none. On specific pieces of legislation or in particular policies, clauses may be 
inserted allowing for temporary derogation. These derogations are never intended to 
be permanent, even if they arguably demonstrate a de facto recognition that some 
member states are not really expected by the others to implement the piece of 
legislation in the foreseeable future. Only very recently in EU history have legislative 
provisions been adopted – in the field of energy market liberalization – that officially 
recognise differentiation in the rules that govern the operation of an industrial sector.  
 
Varying EU member-state participation in European R&D programmes and industrial 
projects can contribute to differentiated integration. However, the degree to which the 
two are linked must be seen as limited. Some differentiation can be detected in the 
context of bi- and multi-lateral industrial initiatives developed by specific EU member 
states. Even so, the contribution of this differentiation in participation to differentiated 
integration is unclear. Derogations and different levels of compliance (as measured by 
Commission notification, court cases brought against member states and other 
statistics) demonstrate differentiated integration.  
 
However, it is discretion allowed in the implementation of EU legislation that remains 
the greatest source of differentiation. An exhaustive study of differentiation through 
discretion is beyond the scope of this chapter. Further research is necessary to 
determine the extent to which this differentiation reflects a persistent ideological 
division in Europe about the meaning of market integration and the desirable nature of 
EU and national industrial policies, rather than temporary differences that better 
reflect different levels of economic development, economic structures and technical 
preferences. 
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1 Wallace and Wallace (1995:53) write: ‘The preoccupation belongs to the period in 
which the R&D and technology programmes of the EC were being developed, closely 
linked to groupings of countries and companies with a particular stake in specific 
high-tech industries. Current EU policy is more diffusely construed and the 
consortium principle of self including groups of countries seems less pertinent, 
especially given the ambivalences of European industrial policy. Some elements of 
the discussion linger on in other frameworks, such as the European Space Agency or 
Eureka. Here we should note in passing that efforts to “communitarise” these 
consortia have not succeeded and thus that their patterns of varied participation 
impinge relatively little on the discussions within the EU as such.’ 
2 Information on bi- and multi-lateral armaments projects has been drawn from T. 
Dyson, ‘Differentiated Cooperation in Defence and Security Policy: Reformed 
Bandwagoning in the Context of Systemic Unipolarity’, paper presented at the 
Workshop on Differentiated Integration, Cardiff, 10-12 September 2008. 
